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- Agents that reason and act autonomoulsly can't be modeled as nature.

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- Each agent's value depends on the outcome.

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
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- a set of actions A_i for each agent i ∈ I.
 An action profile σ is a tuple (a₁,..., a_n), means agent i carries out a_i.
- a utility function utility(σ, i) for action profile σ and agent i ∈ I, gives the expected utility for agent i when all agents follow action profile σ.

		Bob		
		rock	paper	scissors
Alice	rock	0,0	-1,1	1, -1
	paper	1, -1	0,0	-1,1
	scissors	-1, 1	1, -1	0,0

Image: Ima


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Extensive Form of a Game



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Extensive Form of an imperfect-information Game




Bob cannot distinguish the nodes in an information set.

Image: Ima

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Multiagent Decision Networks




Value node for each agent.

Each decision node is owned by an agent.

The parents of each decision node specify what that agent will observe when making the decision

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Multiple Agents, shared value



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