- When giving information, we don't want to enumerate all of the exceptions, even if we could think of them all.
- In default reasoning, we specify general knowledge and modularly add exceptions. The general knowledge is used for cases we don't know are exceptional.
- Classical logic is monotonic: If g logically follows from A, it also follows from any superset of A.
- Default reasoning is <u>nonmonotonic</u>: When we add that something is exceptional, we can't conclude what we could before.

Default reasoning can be modeled using

- *H* is normality assumptions
- *F* states what follows from the assumptions

An explanation of g gives an argument for g.

A reader of newsgroups may have a default: "Articles about AI are generally interesting".

 $H = \{int_ai\},\$

where int_ai means X is interesting if it is about AI. With facts:

```
interesting \leftarrow about_ai \land int_ai.
about_ai.
```

 $\{int_ai\}$ is an explanation for *interesting*.

We can have exceptions to defaults:


```
false \leftarrow interesting \land uninteresting.
```

Suppose an article is about AI but is uninteresting:

```
interesting \leftarrow about_ai \land int_ai.
about_ai.
uninteresting.
```

We cannot explain *interesting* even though everything we know about the previous we also know about this case.

Exceptions to defaults



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"Articles about formal logic are about AI." "Articles about formal logic are uninteresting." "Articles about machine learning are about AI."

```
about_ai \leftarrow about_fl.

uninteresting \leftarrow about_fl.

about_ai \leftarrow about_ml.


interesting \leftarrow about_ai \land int_ai.

false \leftarrow interesting \land uninteresting.

false \leftarrow intro_question \land interesting.
```


Given *about_fl*, is there explanation for *interesting*? Given *about_ml*, is there explanation for *interesting*?

Exceptions to Defaults



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Formal logic is uninteresting by default



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Suppose formal logic articles aren't interesting by default:

 $H = \{unint_fl, int_ai\}$

The corresponding facts are:

```
interesting \leftarrow about_ai \land int_ai.
about_ai \leftarrow about_fl.
uninteresting \leftarrow about_fl \land unint_fl.
false \leftarrow interesting \land uninteresting.
about_fl.
```

Does *uninteresting* have an explanation? Does *interesting* have an explanation?


- For an article about formal logic, the argument "it is interesting because it is about Al" shouldn't be applicable.
- This is an instance of preference for more specific defaults.
- Arguments that articles about formal logic are interesting because they are about AI can be defeated by adding:

 $false \leftarrow about_fl \land int_ai.$

This is known as a cancellation rule.

• We can no longer explain *interesting*.


Diagram of the Default Example



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- What if incompatible goals can be explained and there are no cancellation rules applicable?
 What should we predict?
- For example: what if introductory questions are uninteresting, by default?
- This is the multiple extension problem.
- Recall: an extension of $\langle F, H \rangle$ is the set of logical consequences of F and a maximal scenario of $\langle F, H \rangle$.

Competing Arguments



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- We predict g if g is in all extensions of $\langle F, H \rangle$.
- Suppose g isn't in extension E. As far as we are concerned E could be the correct view of the world. So we shouldn't predict g.
- If g is in all extensions, then no matter which extension turns out to be true, we still have g true.
- Thus g is predicted even if an adversary gets to select assumptions, as long as the adversary is forced to select something. You do not predict g if the adversary can pick assumptions from which g can't be explained.

Recall:logical consequence is defined as truth in all models.We can define default prediction as truth in allminimal modelsSuppose M_1 and M_2 are models of the facts. $M_1 <_H M_2$ if the hypotheses violated by M_1 are a strict

subset of the hypotheses violated by M_2 . That is:

 ${h \in H' : h \text{ is false in } M_1} \subset {h \in H' : h \text{ is false in } M_2}$

where H' is the set of ground instances of elements of H.

Minimal Models and Minimal Entailment

- *M* is a minimal model of *F* with respect to *H* if *M* is a model of *F* and there is no model *M*₁ of *F* such that *M*₁ <_{*H*} *M*.
- g is minimally entailed from $\langle F, H \rangle$ if g is true in all minimal models of F with respect to H.
- Theorem: g is minimally entailed from $\langle F, H \rangle$ if and only if g is in all extensions of $\langle F, H \rangle$.